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DOES GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AID PROMOTE GERMAN EXPORTS? 
Abstract  
This paper uses a static and dynamic gravity model of trade to investigate the link between 
German development aid and exports from Germany to the recipient countries. The findings 
indicate that in the long run German aid is associated with an increase in exports of goods that 
is larger than the aid flow, with a point estimate of 140 percent of the aid given. In addition, 
the evolution of the estimated coefficients over time shows an effect that is consistently 
positive but which oscillates over time. Interestingly, after a decrease in the nineties, the 
estimated coefficients of the effect of aid on trade show a steady increase in the period 
between 2001 and 2005.  The paper distinguishes among recipient countries and finds that the 
return on aid measured by German exports is higher for aid to countries considered “strategic 
aid recipients” by the German government.  We also find some evidence that aid given by 
other EU members reduces German exports.   
Key Words: F10; F35 
JEL Classification: International Trade; Foreign Aid; Germany 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG8) are to promote growth 
and to reduce poverty in developing countries.  In support of this effort, MDG8 calls for a 
new partnership for development, encompassing the goal of providing higher levels of aid to 
countries committed to poverty reduction. In recent decades, a great deal of research effort 
has been devoted to investigating the effects of development assistance on the economic 
performance of the recipient countries (e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 
2001) and to clarifying the recent debate on how aid can help increase the level of exports 
from developing countries, in line with the “aid for trade” concept (Morrissey, 2006).  
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Although promoting economic development is one of the main objectives of foreign- 
aid programs, the motivations for giving aid are diverse and include historical ties and 
political and strategic goals, as well as consideration of the economic interests of aid-giving 
countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  
Given that the economic interests of aid-giving countries play a role in aid allocation, 
it is surprising that only a few authors have investigated the economic effects of aid from a 
donor’s perspective (McKinlay, 1978; McKinlay and Little, 1979; Berthélemy and Tichit, 
2004 and Berthélemy, 2006). In particular, the question arises whether the official 
development assistance (ODA) promotes exports from donors to recipient countries (Nilsson, 
1997; Wagner, 2003; Osei, Morrissey, and Lloyd, 2004). This question is of special interest to 
Germany since the German government is committed, according to EU plans, and in line with 
various international commitments, to increase its official development aid to 0.7 percent of 
GDP by 2015. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, German ODA was below 0.3 percent of 
GDP, rising to 0.37 percent (or about 9b. US$) in 2005.  To reach the goal of 0.7 percent and 
accounting for economic growth in the interim will imply that German ODA must more than 
double in real terms in the next eight years.  
A few studies have investigated the impact of aid on exports from the donor countries 
and generally found quite sizable effects.  The study with the largest effect is by Vogler-
Ludwig et al. (1999). Using data for the period 1976 through 1995 and simple ordinary least 
squares (OLS) panel regressions, the authors found that $1 spent on ODA increased exports 
by $4.3. The purpose of this paper is to address this issue more comprehensively by using a 
longer time horizon, a much larger country sample, a more comprehensive set of control 
variables, and more advanced panel econometric techniques than previous studies, as well as 
using a number of robustness checks and fixed effects for country groups and different time 
periods.  We estimate a static and a dynamic gravity model of German exports to 138 
recipients augmented with development aid for the period 1962 to 2005.   
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To summarize our main results, we find that the increase in exports flowing from 
German aid is somewhat more moderate: around $1.4 US increase of exports for every aid 
dollar spent which is lower than the estimates from previous studies. In addition, the effect is 
greater for developing countries which are target countries of the German Ministry of 
Development (so called “BMZ countries”), i.e., countries where German aid is given based on 
agreements between the German government and the recipient-country government.1  The 
overall effect is remarkably robust but oscillates over time.  It is always positive and has 
increased in recent years (after a decline in the 1990s).   Interestingly, we find some evidence 
that aid from other EU countries displaces German exports (while presumably promoting 
exports from those countries) although that effect is not significant in our preferred 
specifications.  . 
Section 2 presents the theoretical background. Section 3 reviews the recent literature 
on trade and aid. Section 4 discusses the structure of German aid over time and across 
recipients. Section 5 presents the model specification, data sources and variables and main 
results. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In international trade theory researchers have long studied the welfare implications of 
bilateral transfers for donor and recipient countries. The first public discussion of this topic 
was the Keynes-Ohlin debate in relation to the paradoxical effects of German reparations 
(Keynes (1929a,1929b,1929c) and Ohlin (1929a,1929b)). Leontieff (1936) also raised the 
possibility of transfer paradoxes in that foreign aid can be donor-enriching and recipient-
immiserizing; these effects arise due to terms-of-trade effects associated with the aid flows. 
                                               
1
 Other developing countries also receive aid, but through different channels, such as funding from private 
foundations that receive support from the German government, government scholarships to students from these 
countries to study in Germany, and government support for German NGOs providing emergency assistance and 
other project support in that country.  In these cases, the aid flow was not a result of German aid policy targeted 
to that particular country but rather an outcome of the policies and processes of these different programs. 
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Since then, the theoretical literature on transfer paradoxes has been extended to cover more 
general settings and the findings indicate that while such paradoxes can still occur under 
certain conditions, both donors and recipients can benefit from aid transfers (Gale, 1974; 
Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981, 1982; Bhagwati, Brecher, and Hatta, 1983, 1984). Bhagwati et 
al. (1984) present an early survey of this literature. 
More recently, Djajic, Lahiri, and Raimondos-Moller (2004) studied the welfare 
implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of an intertemporal model of trade and 
already considered the impact of aid on donor exports. They find that the net benefits of an 
aid transfer may change over time for both the donor and the recipient. Assuming economic 
and political stability in the recipient country, a temporary transfer of income in the first 
period improves Period One welfare of the recipient and lowers that of the donor. But in the 
presence of habit-formation effects, aid in Period One may serve to shift preferences of the 
recipient in favour of the donor’s export goods in Period Two. When the terms-of-trade effect 
associated with this shift is sufficiently large and the real rate of interest is sufficiently low, 
the second period welfare gain of the donor (at the expense of the recipient) overshadows its 
Period One loss. In addition, this transaction also results in a net increase in welfare of the 
recipient country if the real rate of interest used to discount the Period Two loss is sufficiently 
high, making its present value smaller than the Period One gain. 
In this paper we focus exclusively on the effect of aid on the donor’s exports. With 
this aim and taking into account the above-mentioned theoretical considerations, we expect 
that, in the context of an intertemporal model of trade, development aid could lead to an 
increase in the donor’s exports for several reasons.  First, there might be an impact as a result 
of the fact that a considerable share of donor aid in the time period we analyze was previously 
tied to exports from the donor country.  Up until the 1990s, approximately 50 percent of the 
donors’ development aid was tied to exports. However, this number is much smaller today, 
and for the German case amounts to only 7 percent of development aid (Development 
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Assistance Committee, OECD (2008)).  While tied aid is on the decline and now rarely given, 
it might have an effect.  This “tied aid” effect would clearly be smaller than the amount of aid 
sent, as a considerable share of aid is spent paying local labor, funding technical assistance, 
and purchasing local supplies, and would thus not show up as exports from the donor country. 
Second, we hypothesize that there may be habit-formation effects in the sense that donor-
funded exports for aid-related projects might increase the proclivity of recipient countries to 
buy goods from the donor, as discussed in the model of Djajic et al (2004).  Such an effect 
would go beyond tied aid and might be much larger than the direct effect of tied aid.  Third, 
we assume that the aid relationship promotes a trade relationship in the sense that it creates 
“goodwill” towards donor exporters and as donor countries might often combine aid missions 
and negotiations with trade missions, the aid relationship might “open the door” for donor 
exporters.   
In order to evaluate the total effect that could arise out of tied aid, habit formation or 
goodwill effects of aid on exports empirically, we below apply a gravity model of trade as a 
basic framework. Solid theoretical foundations that provide a consistent base for empirical 
analysis have been developed in the past three decades for this model (Anderson, 1979; 
Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The major contribution of Anderson 
and van Wincoop (AvW) was the appropriate modeling of trade costs to explain bilateral 
exports.  The AvW model has been recently extended to applications explicitly involving 
developed and less developed countries by Nelson and Juhasz Silva (2007). They present an 
extension of AvW to the asymmetric north-south case and derive some implications related to 
the effect of aid on trade. Their results indicate that if the economy of a donor country (GDP) 
is larger than that of the recipient country by at least the monetary value of the foreign aid, 
there is an increase in exports from the larger country to the smaller. The intuitive rationale 
behind this effect is that as a result of the transfer, the two countries become more similar in 
size, and the more similar in size two countries are, the more they trade with one another. 
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3. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON AID AND TRADE 
We now turn to the existing empirical literature on aid and trade. There is a vast literature on 
the determinants of aid allocation (e.g. McKinlay, 1978; McKinlay and Little, 1979; Maizels 
and Nissanke, 1984; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004 and Berthélemy, 
2006). With respect to the impact of trade on aid allocation, Berthélemy (2006) used bilateral 
exports as a percentage of the donor GDP as one of the proxies for “the self-interest-of-donor 
argument”. The dependent variable is aid commitments rather than aid disbursements, 
because according to the author (and as discussed in the related literature) this variable 
reflects the donor decisions. They obtain a positive influence of trade linkages on aid 
allocation and identify three clusters of donors according to the estimated elasticity of aid to 
trade intensity: Altruistic, moderately egoistic and egoistic. Germany is classified in the 
middle group with an estimated elasticity of aid to exports of 0.29 which is significant at the 
one percent level. Since this literature indicates that the aid and trade link can also go from 
exports to development aid, we will need to deal with the simultaneity bias issue in the 
empirical section of the paper. 
In the remainder of the literature review, in line with the focus of our study, we 
concentrate on the reverse causal link, i.e. from trade to aid flows. In recent years, a number 
of researchers have investigated the relationship between aid and bilateral trade flows from 
donors to recipients. Some of them focus on quantifying the impact of donors’ aid on trade. 
Since in many cases aid was once contingent upon purchasing goods from the donor, tied aid 
may automatically create such export effects (Michaelowa, 1997).  
The recent literature on the effect of aid on exports from donor countries has been 
divided.  Most studies use the gravity model of trade as the empirical framework. Among 
those who found a positive effect of aid on trade was Nilsson (1997), who analyzed the link 
between aid and exports for European Union donors to 108 recipients. He estimated a static 
 8 
specification of the gravity model for the period 1975 to 1992 (three-year averages) and found 
an elasticity of exports with respect to aid of 0.23 that translates into a $2.6 US increase of 
exports for each dollar of aid given. He also computed donors’ specific elasticities, and for 
Germany the return on foreign aid was a $3.16 increase in exports for each dollar of aid given. 
Wagner (2003) also used a gravity model of trade to investigate the effect of aid on trade for 
twenty donors to 109 recipient countries for the years 1970 to 1990. He obtained elasticities 
of trade with respect to aid in the range of 0.062 (for fixed-effects (FE) specification) to 0.195 
(for the pooled OLS). The estimated average return on donors’ aid according to the OLS (FE) 
result was $2.29 in OLS ($0.73 in FE) of exports per dollar of aid. The author also obtained 
estimates using a non-linear model in order to decompose the direct and indirect effects of aid 
on trade. He found that the direct effect was only a 35-cent increase and much lower than the 
indirect effect (98 cents). In addition, he concluded that the effect of past aid on trade was 
positive although very small (18 cents) and for Germany the return on aid obtained with the 
non-linear model was 1.15$ of exports per dollar of aid. 
In the second subset of the literature, we find some studies that deviate from the 
gravity model framework. A few authors studied the direction of the causality by using 
Granger causality tests. On the one hand, Arvin, Cater, and Choudhry (2000) examined the 
direction of the causality between untied assistance and exports using German data for the 
period 1973 to 1995. Their findings provide some support for the export-promotion 
hypothesis whereby untied aid disbursements generate goodwill for the donor. On the other 
hand, Lloyd, McGillivray, Morrissey, and Osei (2000) examined data on aid and trade flows 
for a sample of four European donors and 26 African recipients over the period from 1969 to 
1995. Using Granger causality tests, they found evidence showing that trade Granger-caused 
aid in 14 percent of the country pairs, aid Granger-caused trade in 13 percent of the cases and 
bi-directional causality was found in 8 percent of the pairs. Further, they find that a more 
common link is that trade relations are a factor influencing donor allocation, rather than that 
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aid generates these trade relations. Along the same lines, Osei, Morrissey, and Lloyd (2004) 
extended the analysis to more countries and also found no evidence that aid generates trade 
when testing for the relationship between aid and trade for different subsamples, although 
donors providing a higher share of aid tend to trade more with the recipients. They conclude 
that donors appear to be concerned with relative aid and trade shares rather than absolute 
volumes. In the study here we consider a much larger sample of countries and use a panel-
data approach which is particularly appropriate in situations when the number of cross-section 
observations is large and one is particularly interested in identifying an average effect.2   
Our challenge and contribution in this paper is to consider dynamic effects of aid, as in 
the second strand of the literature, but relying on the gravity model of trade, as in the first 
strand of the literature.  In addition, we will examine a longer time period, more recipient 
countries, more covariates, and a more advanced econometric framework, and will use 
extensive robustness checks.  
 
4. THE VOLUME AND STRUCTURE OF GERMAN AID 
The standard used to measure development funding is the Official Development Assistance as 
a percentage of Gross National Income (ODA/GNI ratio). The repository of official 
information on aid is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. DAC 
used to distinguish between two types of recipient:  part I (least developed (LDC), low and 
middle-income countries) and part II (transition and high-income) countries.  Due to frequent 
changes in those lists, the DAC therefore decided in 2005 to revert to a single List of ODA 
Recipients, abolishing Part II. 
                                               
2
 The time series approach by  Lloyd et al. (2000) and Osei et al. (2004) is an alternative to the panel-data 
approach particularly when the number of cross-sections is smaller than the time dimension of the data.  
However, when the number of cross-section (recipient countries) is large and the main interest is to find out an 
average effect, a panel data approach could be more appropriate.  See also Nowak-Lehmann et al (2008) for an 
analysis of the impact of German aid on exports using a time series approach. 
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Development aid has to satisfy three criteria to be classified as ODA. First, it has to be 
undertaken by official agencies. Second, the main objective of aid has to be the promotion of 
economic development, and third and finally, it has to have a grant element of at least 25 
percent. It is worth noting that neither private aid given by non-governmental organizations 
nor military aid is considered part of ODA.  
ODA is further classified into bilateral ODA (given directly by a donor country) and 
multilateral ODA (given by an international institution such as the World Bank or the United 
Nations). As with most studies on aid, we focus on bilateral ODA, but specifically, that given 
by Germany. We also consider the effect of bilateral ODA given by the EU members 
(excluding Germany).  We do this to find out whether a specific bilateral aid relationship 
could also be affected by the bilateral aid relationships of other individual donor countries.  In 
particular, we hypothesize that aid from other EU members might displace exports from 
Germany and thus have a negative effect.   
How much does Germany spend on development? The German ODA-to-GNI ratio 
over the period from 1964 to 2005 varied between 0.47 percent in the early eighties and 0.26 
percent in 1999. Aid flows increased in the late 1970s and decreased in the 1980s and 1990s. 
After 1999 aid flows started increasing again. In terms of relative importance, in the past three 
decades Germany has been among the five most important donors in terms of bilateral aid. 
According to OECD figures, German bilateral aid accounts for around 10 to 15 percent of 
total bilateral aid. 
Concerning the geographical distribution, German aid is more evenly distributed 
among recipients than is aid from the other donors. A higher percentage is directed to Sub 
Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa, especially in the most recent years, 
whereas aid shares to Latin America and Asia show a decreasing trend.  
 
5. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF THE GRAVITY MODEL  
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5.1 Model specification 
The gravity model of trade is nowadays the most commonly accepted framework to model 
bilateral trade flows (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). 
According to the underlying theory, trade between two countries is explained by nominal 
incomes and the populations of the trading countries, by the distance between the economic 
centers of the exporter and importer, and by a number of trade impediment and facilitation 
variables. Dummy variables, such as trade agreements, common language, or a common 
border, are generally used to proxy for these factors. The traditional gravity model is specified 
as 
 
ijijijjijiij uFDISTPOPPOPYYX 6543210
ααααααα= ,                                                    (1) 
 
where Yi (Yj) indicates the GDPs of the exporter (importer), POPi (POPj) are exporter 
(importer) populations,  DISTij is geographical distances between countries i and j, and Fij 
denotes other factors impeding or facilitating trade (e.g., trade agreements, common 
language, or a common border). 
The gravity model has been widely used to investigate the role played by specific policy or 
geographical variables in explaining bilateral trade flows. Consistent with this approach and 
in order to investigate the effect of development aid on German exports, we augment the 
traditional model with bilateral aid from Germany and other EU countries and also with 
exchange rates3. Usually the model is estimated in log-linear form. Taking logarithms in 
Equation 1, restricting the income and population coefficients to be equal (α1 =α2 and α3=α4) 
and introducing time variation, the static specification of the gravity model is 
 
                                               
3
 When the gravity model is estimated using panel data (with a time dimension), exchange rates are generally 
included as important determinants of bilateral trade flows over time. 
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where:  
L denotes variables in natural logs; 
Xjt are the exports from Germany to country j in period t in current US$; 
LYYTt=ln(YGt* Yjt),where YGt and Yjt indicates Germany’s and the recipient’s GDP, 
respectively, in period t at current PPP US$; 
LPOPTt=ln(POPGt*POPjt), where POPGt and POPjt denotes the population of Germany and 
country j respectively, in period t in thousand inhabitants; 
DISTij is the great circle distance between Germany and country j; 
EXRNjt is the nominal bilateral exchange rate in monetary units of the recipient currency per 
Euro; 
BAIDGjt is bilateral official gross development aid from Germany to country j in current 
US$; and EUAIDjt is EU official gross development aid by EU countries (except Germany) to 
country j in current US$; 
The model includes dummy variables for African, Caribbean, and Pacific trading partners 
sharing preferential trade agreements with the EU (PTA), for independent countries (INDEP), 
and for countries belonging to the GATT/WTO (WTO); it is important to note that all these 
variables are time-varying as independence, membership in PTA and GATT/WTO trade 
agreements occurred during the time period studied for many countries. tφ  are specific time 
effects that control for omitted variables common to all trade flows but which vary over 
time. jδ  are importer effects that proxy for multilateral resistance factors. When these effects 
are included, the influence of the variables that vary only with the “j” dimension cannot be 
directly estimated. This is the case for distance; therefore its effect is subsumed in the country 
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dummies. Since the variable of interest is development aid, the income and population 
coefficients are restricted to be equal. 
Considering that trade relations once established might last for a long time, it makes 
sense to consider that current export volumes also depend on past exports. Therefore, we 
estimate a dynamic version of Equation 2. In order to model dynamics, we consider the 
introduction of the Koyck geometric lag structure that includes the lagged dependent variable 
as an additional regressor. The main problems of this specification are related to the statistical 
difficulties caused by the combination of an endogenous regressor (lagged exports) and 
autocorrelated errors. As a result, the OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent (the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased towards unity, whereas the remaining 
coefficients are biased towards zero).  
Nevertheless, these difficulties can be overcome using more sophisticated estimation 
techniques that control for endogeneity of the explanatory variables and for autocorrelated 
errors. The dynamic specification is given by 
 
jtjtjtjt
TtTttjjtjt
LEUAIDLBAIDGLEXRN
LPOPLYYXX
εβββ
ββλδφγ
++++
++++++=
−
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211,
''
0
' lnln
         (3) 
where most of the variables are described above and Xj,t-1  is exports from Germany to country 
j in period t-1 in current US$.  
According to equations 2 and 3 we are assuming that the relationship between German 
aid and German exports is linear.  This is plausible upon inspection of a scatter plot between 
both variables (available upon request) and also given the small magnitude of the aid figures 
in comparison to the export figures. Specification tests also rejected the inclusion of a 
quadratic aid-term in the estimated equation. 
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 As discussed above, there might be another endogeneity issue referring to aid being 
‘caused’ by exports, rather than the reverse.  This is an issue we will take up below, where we 
report on further robustness and specification checks using different methods. 
5.2 Data sources and variables 
Official Development Aid data are from the OECD Development Database on Aid 
from DAC Members. We consider gross ODA disbursements in current US$4, instead of aid 
commitments, because we are interested in the funds actually released to the recipient 
countries in a given year. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial 
resources, or the transfer of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. Bilateral exports 
are obtained from the UN COMTRADE database. Data on income and population variables 
are drawn from the World Bank (World Development Indicators Database, 2007). Bilateral 
exchange rates are from the IMF statistics. Distances between capitals have been computed as 
great-circle distances using data on straight-line distances in kilometres, latitudes and 
longitudes from the CIA World Fact Book. 
 
5.3 Results 
A static and a dynamic version of the model are estimated for data on German exports 
and development aid (ODA) to 138 recipient countries during the period from 1962 to 2005. 
Table 1 reports the main estimation results. The first and second column show the results 
obtained for the static model. Individual (country) effects (modelled as fixed) are included to 
control for unobservable heterogeneous effects across recipients. Those effects are also a 
proxy for the so-called “multilateral resistance” factors modelled by Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003). Time-fixed effects are also included to model specific unobservable time 
effects. We rely on the two-way FE estimates, since a Wald test indicates that the individual 
effects are jointly significant, while a Hausman test indicates that these effects are correlated 
                                               
4
 The gross amount comprises total grants and loans extended (according to DAC). 
 15 
with the error term. Since our data consists on a time span of more than 40 years and a cross-
section of 138 countries, we tested for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
The results of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and the LR test for 
heteroskedasticity indicate that both problems are present in the data. Hence, given the strong 
rejection of the null in both tests, the model is re-estimated with HAC (heteroskedastic and 
autocorrelated consistent standard errors) that are robust to autocorrelation and to 
heteroskedasticity. Column 2 reports the results for the two-way FE estimates with a common 
AR(1) term. 
With respect to the variable of interest, bilateral aid, controlling for autocorrelation 
slightly decreases the magnitude of the estimated coefficient from 0.088 to 0.051. The 
estimated coefficient is always positive and significant, indicating that a one-percent increase 
in German aid raises German exports by 0.051 percent. The effect is small compared to that 
shown in previous studies that did not control for country and time effects, but still positive 
and significant. However, the estimated coefficient for the official gross development aid of 
other EU members is negative and statistically significant in the first specification, whereas it 
is not statistically significant when controlling for autocorrelation. This suggests that 
Germany does not benefit from aid given by other EU members and might actually be hurt by 
it.  In fact, when other EU-countries give higher amounts of aid, the “goodwill” and “habit 
formation” factors mentioned above could promote those countries’ exports generating an 
indirect negative effect on German exports.  
Most of the other variables present the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
The explanatory power of the model is good, since the included variables explain 
approximately 70 percent of the variation of German exports. The coefficient of total income 
is positive and significant and slightly lower than the theoretical value of unity.  The 
coefficient of total population is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 
the first specification without controlling for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The same 
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holds for the coefficient of the bilateral exchange rate that has a negative coefficient that is 
only statistically significant when autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are not controlled 
for. The negative sign indicates that depreciation of the Euro (a decrease in the exchange rate) 
with respect to the recipient currencies would, as to be expected, have a positive effect on 
German exports. The effect of distance could not be directly estimated in the two-way FE 
estimation. Since distance is constant over time, its effect is subsumed in the country 
dummies. The PTA dummy for membership in the preferential trade agreement with the EU is 
negative and significant indicating that Germany exports less to PTA participaiting countries 
than to the rest of the countries in the sample and the “independent state” dummy presents a 
positive sign and is significant in both estimations.  While the preferential trade agreements 
might promote exports from these countries to the EU, they apparently do little to promote 
exports from Germany to these countries. 
For comparison purposes, Equation 2 was also estimated on data of five-year averages, 
to reduce the effects of temporary shocks and to avoid cyclical effects. Two main differences 
are encountered with respect to the estimation for yearly data. First, the effect of German aid 
on German exports is considerably higher in magnitude than before (0.11). Second, the 
coefficients of populations, EU aid, and “independent state” dummy are no longer significant, 
according to the RE and FE estimates.  Using the results in column 2, we find that, in static 
terms, the average return on aid for German exports is approximately a 0.64 US dollar 
increase in exports for every aid dollar spent. This average is calculated as 
64.0
18234
229000
*051.0** ===
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Columns 3 to 6 in Table 1 show the main estimation results obtained for the dynamic 
model (Equation 3). In general, the estimated parameter for lagged exports is always 
statistically significant and with the expected positive sign pointing towards the importance of 
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persistence in export flows. The short-term coefficients of the variables are smaller than the 
long-term coefficients and the latter are slightly higher than those obtained before (static 
model) with the signs remaining generally unchanged. 
Column 3 presents the parameter estimates of the dynamic model with the variables in levels. 
Model 3 was estimated using 2SFGLS (two stages feasible generalised least squares) with 
fixed effects to control for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable and for 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated in the error term. The Hausman test indicates that only the 
within estimator5 is consistent, since the null hypothesis (orthogonality between the individual 
effects and the regressors) is rejected. In addition, the 2SFGLS within estimates are less 
precisely (higher standard errors), but consistently, estimated. 
According to the above figure, the long-term average return on aid for German exports is a 
1.4-dollar increase in exports for every aid dollar spent. Therefore, aid appears to be export-
creating when dynamics are modelled and the magnitude of the effect is higher than the one 
obtained using the static model.  
With respect to the other variables included in the model, the expected positive 
coefficient for income is obtained; Germany exports more to countries with higher incomes. 
Population in the recipient countries shows a negative coefficient which is only significant at 
ten percent level in the 2SFGLS results. Aid from other EU members shows, as in the static 
model, a negative effect; however, this effect is not significant when controlling for 
autocorrelation and for endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable.  
Lagged aid was initially added to the list of explanatory variables, however, we found 
that the corresponding estimated parameter was not significant. A similar result was found by 
Wagner (2003), who stated in page 171: “The trade benefit appear to be limited almost 
entirely to the year that the donation is made”. The reason for this could be that we, as well as 
Wagner, are using aid disbursements and it is the announcement of the policy decision (aid 
                                               
5
 Although the Hausman tests point towards the inconsistency of the random-effects estimates (not reported), the 
coefficient estimates for bilateral aid are practically equal in magnitude and sign. 
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commitment) which is the factor primarily influencing future donor’s exports, whereas the 
actual international transfer (disbursements) has an effect exclusively on present exports.  
Next, in order to test for the stability of the estimated coefficients over time, equation 
3 is estimated for eight different sub-periods. Although the first-differences GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) has commonly been used in the literature of dynamic 
panel data estimations for short time spans, when data are highly persistent, as in the case of 
bilateral export flows, Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that this procedure can be improved 
by using the system GMM estimation, which supplements the equations in first differences 
with equations in levels; for the former, the instruments used are the lagged levels, and for the 
latter, the instruments are the lagged differences. Columns 4 to 6 in Table 1 show the results 
using system GMM for three subperiods. We keep the number of years in each period below 
eight because the number of instruments tends to explode upwards with time. The use of too 
many instruments, can over-fit endogenous variables and weaken the power of the Hansen 
test to detect over-identification. In the present case, the Hansen test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of validity of the instruments and the autocorrelation tests indicate that second-
order autocorrelation is not present in the data. The results concerning bilateral aid indicate 
that the return on German aid was much lower in the late 1960s and in the 1970s (around 60 
cents of exports for each dollar of aid) than in the early eighties (two dollars for each one 
dollar of aid) and it has been quite stable since 1986 onwards (around 1.5 dollars per dollar of 
aid). This result is reassuring and very similar to the average effect found for the whole 
sample using 2SFGLS ($1.4 per dollar of aid). These results also suggest that tied aid is not 
the most important driver of these export effects. While the export effects seem to have 
increased over time, tied aid was on the decline.  
As a first robustness check, we estimated Equation 3 for different groups of countries in order 
to ascertain whether the effect of bilateral aid could vary among recipients. The groups we 
consider are countries where Germany has a formal aid relationship (BMZ countries), 
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countries where aid flows are the results of state support for NGOs and private foundations 
doing projects or emergency relief, scholarships and training programs for people from these 
countries (non-BMZ countries), countries that now belong to the group of states enjoying 
preferential access to the EU (ACP) least developed countries (LDC). Since we are interested 
in the within-country variation and in the average-long-term effect, the 2SFGLS with fixed 
effects provides the preferred estimates. The results are shown in Table 2. It is worth noting 
that the return for exports on German aid is markedly higher for BMZ countries ($2.33 of 
exports for each dollar of aid), in fact, it is almost twice the average effect for all countries. 
This is quite plausible as only in these countries we would expect the export-increasing 
effects. Also, for the group of non-BMZ countries the coefficient of bilateral aid is not 
statistically significant. Finally, the return for exports is relatively low for ACP countries 
(0.30), and even lower for least-developed countries, for which one dollar of aid generates 
only 19 cents of exports. These results indicate that what might have appeared to be 
differences in the variances of the disturbances across groups may well be due to 
heterogeneity associated with the coefficient vectors.6  
A second robustness check consists on re-estimating the 2SFGLS fixed-effect model 
with time variant coefficients for the bilateral aid variable. Figure 1 shows the obtained 
estimates. The evolution of the estimated coefficients over time shows a positive long-term 
trend. Interestingly, after a decrease in the nineties, the estimated coefficients of the effect of 
aid on trade show a steady increase in the period between 2001 and 2005. Concerning the 
significance of the coefficients, in only in three short periods (1965 to 1972, 1980 to 1984, 
and 1996 to 2000) were they not significant. In order to control for the high variation of the 
bilateral aid coefficients over time, we also re-estimated the model, averaging the data over 
five-year periods. The time effects show a decreasing trend until 1985 and from then onward, 
                                               
6
 This issue is also investigated in Nowak-Lehmann D. et al.  (2008) where the time series variation of the data is 
exploited and the focus is exclusively on the German aid-trade relationship for BMZ countries, which seems to 
be more robust. 
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an increasing effect of bilateral German aid on German exports (the results are available upon 
request). 
Previous studies found a larger effect of development aid on German exports. For 
example, we obtained a lower return on aid for German exports than Nilsson (1997) and 
Wagner (2003). On the one hand, Nilsson reported an average return on aid for exports of a 
roughly $2.6 increase in exports for every dollar spent, whereas in this study, the average 
return is around $1.5 (although larger for the BMZ countries). There are two explanations for 
the different results obtained. First, in Nilsson (1997), the period under study is from 1975 to 
1992, whereas we considered the period from 1960 to 2005. The larger time span give rise to 
a lower average return on aid. In fact, the results from the regressions for different subperiods 
indicate that the return on aid was higher in the 1980s and early 1990s than it was for the early 
seventies and the late 1990s. Second, in Nilsson (1997), the data were converted to three-year 
averages of constant 1987 dollars and fixed effects were not included; only specific aid 
coefficients for donors and a trend were specified. On the other hand, the fixed effects results 
obtained by Wagner (2003) implied that exports derived from a dollar of aid amount to 73 
cents for a sample of twenty donors, 108 recipients and 5 years (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 
1990). This result, in the context of a static gravity model, is close to ours (64 cents as 
reported in the last row of column 2 in Table 1 for the 2-Way FE model). However Wagner 
was not able to control for autocorrelation in the error term and our results show that 
controlling for it reduces the estimated elasticity. Wagner also reported the implied returns for 
all donors. For Germany the return on aid was estimated at 1.15$ of exports for each dollar of 
aid, but those estimates were based on a non-linear relationship without fixed effects. 
Finally, we also considered the existence of reverse causation. Causation may run 
from exports to aid, as well, since a strong export performance may encourage the donor 
country to increase its level of aid to the recipient. A way to overcome this problem is to 
model German aid as an endogenous variable. Therefore, we also instrumented for 
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development aid in the 2SFGLS regression and in the GMM regressions using the lagged 
values of aid (in addition to instrumenting for the lagged dependent variables).7 We then 
performed and endogeneity test. Under the null hypothesis that the specific endogenous 
regressor can actually be treated as exogenous, the test statistic is distributed as a chi2 with 
one degree of freedom. The results of the tests are shown at the end of column 3 in Table 1 
and indicate that its null that bilateral German aid may be treated as exogenous cannot be 
rejected.  
As an alternative robustness check, we performed the pre-tests of Osei, Morrissey, and 
Lloyd, but using a general to specific approach. We specified a VAR model including all the 
“gravity variables” and in this context, we tested for cointegration in the full sample (138 
countries). Pedroni’s residual panel-cointegration test indicated cointegration, i.e. the null 
hypothesis of “no cointegration” could not be rejected in the majority of the cases. We also 
tested whether aid Granger causes exports using an error correction model. We found that aid 
Granger causes trade in the long run. Granger causality could not be observed for the short 
run. We also tested whether exports Granger cause aid. We found that exports do not Granger 
cause aid in the long run. Granger causality could only be observed for the short run (results 
are available upon request).8  These robustness checks suggest that the results are quite robust 
and point indeed to the causality running from aid to exports.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
There are three basic messages in this paper. First, German aid has a positive effect on 
German exports. Although the effect is not as large as predicted by previous studies, it is still 
relevant. Our findings indicate that the average return for exports on German aid is about a 
                                               
7
 These results are not shown but available on request.   
8
 For the second causality test and according to the literature on aid allocation, it would be more reasonable to 
use aid commitments instead of aid disbursements, but we stuck to this specification to compare it to our own 
results.  See also Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2008) for a more detailed examination of the impact of aid on trade 
using time series approaches, including also Granger causality tests.  The findings from that paper are 
remarkably similar to the results here, suggesting that the methods used do not drive the results.   
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1.4-dollar increase in exports for every dollar spent. Second, this effect differs among groups 
of recipients. The return on German aid for exports is much higher for developing countries 
which have a real aid relationship with Germany (BMZ countries).  Third, there is some 
evidence that aid from other EU countries displace German exports, although that result is 
significant only in a few specifications.    
This investigation and the related literature suggest that the impact of aid on trade 
depends on the specific pair of trading countries evaluated and on the type of aid given, and 
also that the impact can change over time. The relationship between trade and aid could be 
more closely analyzed by using more donor countries, focusing on country case studies, or 
using disaggregated aid data and sectoral trade data to have a more precise characterization of 
the direction of causality and the quantification of the effects. Further research would also be 
desirable on the interactions between development aid and the recipient’s trade policy to 
investigate the existence of complementarities.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We would like to thank Jutta Albrecht, Dierk Herzer, Adolf Kloke-Lesch, Rigmar Osterkamp, 
and Klaus Wardenbach, two anonymous referees and the participants in the Annual 
Conference of the German Economic Association/ Research Committee Development 
Economics (Zurich, May 2008) and in the GTAP conference (Helsinki, June 2008) for helpful 
comments and discussion.  Funding from the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and 
Development and from Projects Caja Castellón-Bancaja: P1-1B2005-33 and SEJ2007-67548 
in support of this work is gratefully acknowledged. 
 23 
REFERENCES 
Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000), ‘Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why?’, Journal of 
Economic Growth 5, 33-63.  
Anderson, J. E. (1979), ‘A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation’, American 
Economic Review 69, 106-116. 
Anderson, J.E. and Van Wincoop, E. (2003), ‘Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border 
Puzzle’, American Economic Review 93, 170-192. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991), ‘Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and Application to Employment Equations’, Review of Economic Studies 58, 
227-297. 
Arvin, M., Cater, B. and Choudhry, S. (2000), ‘A Causality Analysis of Untied Foreign 
Assitance and Export Performance: The Case of Germany’, Applied Economics 
Letters 7, 315-319.  
Bergstrand, J.H. (1985), ‘The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some Microeconomic 
Foundations and Empirical Evidence’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 67, 
474-481. 
Berthélemy, J. C. and Tichit, A. (2004), ‘Bilateral Donors’ Aid Allocation Decision: A Three-
Dimensional Panel Analysis’, International Review of Economics and Finance 13, 
253-274. 
Berthélemy, J. C., (2006), ‘Bilateral Donor’s Interest versus Recipient’s Development 
Motives in Aid Allocation: Do all Donors Behave the same?’ Review of Development 
Economics 10 (2), 224-240. 
 
Bhagwati, J.N., Brecher, R. and Hatta, T. (1983), ‘The Generalized Theory of Transfers and 
Welfare: Bilateral Transfers in a Multilateral World’, American Economic Review 73, 
606-618. 
 24 
Bhagwati, J.N., Brecher, R.A., and Hatta, T. (1984), ‘The Paradoxes of Immiserizing Growth 
and Donor-Enriching ‘Recipient-Immiserizing’ Transfers: A Tale of Two Literatures’, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 120, 228-243. 
Bhargava, A., Franzini, L. and Narendranthan, W. (1982), ‘Serial Correlation and the Fixed 
Effects Model’, The Review of Economic Studies 49, 533-549. 
Blundell, R. W. and Bond, S.R. (1998), ‘Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models’, Journal of Econometrics 87, 115-143. 
Brecher, R. A. and Bhagwati, J. N. (1981), ‘Foreign Ownership and the Theory of Trade and 
Welfare’, Journal of Political Economy 89, 497-511. 
Brecher, R.A. and Bhagwati, J.N. (1982), ‘Immiserizing Transfers from Abroad’, Journal of 
International Economics 13, 353-64. 
Burnside, G. and Dollar, D. (2000), ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’, American Economic Review  
90 (4), 847-868. 
Djajic, S., Lahiri, S., and Raimondos-Moller, P. (2004), ‘Logic of Aid in an Intertemporal 
Setting‘, Review of International Economics 12, 151-161. 
Fleck, R. K. and Kilby, C. (2006), ‘World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical 
Analysis of US Influence’, Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 224-240.  
Gale, D. (1974), ‘Exchange Equilibrium and Coalitions: An example’, Journal of 
Mathematical Economics 1, 63-66.  
Hansen, H. and Tarp, F. (2001), ‘Aid and Growth Regressions’, Journal of Development 
Economics 64, 547-570. 
Keynes, J.M. (1929a), ‘The German Transfer Problem’, Economic Journal 39, 1-7. 
Keynes, J.M. (1929b), ‘The Reparation Problem, A Discussion’, The Economic Journal 39, 
172-182. 
Keynes, J.M. (1929c), ‘Mr. Keynes’ Views on the Transfer Problem’, The Economic Journal, 
39, 388-408. 
 25 
Leontieff, W. (1936), ‘Note on the Pure Theory of Capital Transfer’, in: Explorations in 
Economics: Notes and Essays Contributed in Honor of F. W. Taussig, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, New York.  
Lloyd, T.A., McGillivray, M., Morrissey, O., and Osei, R. (2000), ‘Does Aid Create Trade? 
An Investigation for European Donors and African Recipients’, European Journal of 
Development Research 12, 1-16.  
Maizels, A., and M.K. Nissanke (1984), ‘Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries’, 
World Development 12(9), 879-900. 
McKinlay, R.D. (1978); ‘The German Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need and the 
Donor Interest Models of the Distribution of German Bilateral Aid 1961-70’, 
European Journal of Political Research 6, 235-257. 
McKinlay, R. D. and Little, R. (1979); ‘The US Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient 
Need and the Donor Interest Models’, Political Studies 27 (2),183-349. 
 
Michaelowa, K. (1997), ‘Bestimmungsfaktoren liefergebundener Entwicklungshilfe - eine 
politökonomische Analyse’ Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Soczialwissenchaften 4, 
603-622. 
Morrissey, O. (2006), ‘Aid or Trade, or Aid and Trade?’, The Australian Economic Review 
39, 78–88. 
Nelson, D. and Juhasz Silva, S. (2007), ‘Does Aid Cause Trade? Evidence from an 
Asymmetric Gravity Model’, Murphy Institute, Tulane University, New Orleans. 
Nilsson, L. (1997), ‘Aid and Donor Exports: The Case of the EU Countries’, in: Nilsson, L., 
Essays on North-South Trade, Lund Economic Studies 70, Lund. 
Nowak-Lehmann D., F., Martínez-Zarzoso, I., Klasen, S, and Herzer, D. (2008), ‘Aid and 
Trade: A Donor’s Perspective’, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research 
Discussion Paper No. 171.  Göttingen: Ibero-America Institute.  . 
 26 
OECD (2008), ‘Development Co-Operation Report 2007’, OECD Journal on Development, 
OECD, Paris. 
Ohlin, B. (1929a), ‘The Reparations Problem: A Discussion’, Economic Journal 39, 172-178 . 
Ohlin, B. (1929b), ‘The Reparations Problem: A Discussion’, Economic Journal 39, 400-404. 
Osei, R., Morrissey, O., and Lloyd T.A. (2004), ‘The Nature of Aid and Trade Relationships’, 
European Journal of Development Research 16, 354-374. 
Vogler-Ludwig, K., Schönherr, S., Taube, M., and Blau, H. (1999), ‘Die Auswirkungen der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit auf den Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland’,  
Forschungsberichte des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung- BMZ - Band 124. Weltforum Verlag.  
Wagner, D. (2003), ‘Aid and Trade: An Empirical Study’, Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies 17, 153-173. 
World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM, Washington, DC 
 
 27 
Tables 
Table 1. Effect of bilateral aid on German exports  
 
Variables: Static 2-
Way FE 
Static 2-
Way FE-
CAR(1) 
Dynamic 
2SFGLS 
with FE 
Dynamic System 
GMM 
(1991-95) 
Dynamic 
System 
GMM 
(1996-2000) 
Dynamic 
System 
GMM 
(2001-05) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
LX(-1) - - 0.664  -0.0117 0.587 0.645 
 
- - 15.994  -0.070 4.010 7.090 
LYY 0.780 0.678 0.291  0.938 0.446 0.405 
 
19.108 16.012 6.515  5.570 2.500 3.840 
LPOP -0.279 0.010 
-0.1  0.0754 -0.0863 -0.080 
 
-2.351 0.090 
-1.079  0.66 -1.33 -1.41 
LEXRN -0.021 -0.019 0.005  -0.037 -0.008 -0.011 
 
-2.291 -1.367 0.682  -1.190 -0.670 -0.680 
LBAIDG 0.088 0.051 0.037  0.165 0.0935 0.0780 
 
6.294 4.849 2.707  2.470 2.010 2.780 
LEUAID -0.026 -0.004 
-0.007  -0.123 -0.056 -0.033 
 
-2.083 -0.289 
-0.728  -1.680 -1.740 -0.900 
PTA -0.087 -0.085 
-0.066     
 
-2.074 -1.283 
-1.967     
INDEP 1.068 1.699 1.221     
 
3.187 7.194 4.825     
WTO -0.048 0.072 
-0.005     
 
-1.424 1.400 
-0.19     
CONSTANT 2.968 0.573 
  
 -10.79 -4.611 -4.557 
 
0.672 4.167 
  
 -4.850 -2.190 -3.390 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
LongRun Aid 
Coeff 
  
0.11 
 
0.163 0.226 0.220 
Adj. R Sq. 0.695 0.585 0.766     
Nobs 3793 3662 3536  438 472 474 
Wooldridge Test 
Autoc. 
F(1,128)=19
.424 
Prob=0.00 
 
  
N Instr. 18 18 18 
LR Test Hetero. Chi2(130)=2
321 
Prob=0.00 
 
  
    
Return on Aid 1.105 0.641 1.389  1.631 1.364 1.520 
Bhargaba et al.(1) DW  2.06 Ar1 -2.618** -2.615** -1.977 
Log-Likelihood  
-1752.038 Ar2 -0.447 -0.500 0.757 
RMSE   0.405 Hansen 4.956 10.240 9.610 
Hansen (Probability)  1.389 (0.239) Hansendf 8 8 8 
Endogeneity test (Probability)  1.260 (0.261)     
Note: The first two columns present estimations of the static model, columns 4 to 6 the dynamic model.  
Columns 2 and 3 control for autocorrelation and column 3 additionally, for the endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable. All the variables are in natural logarithms. The dependent variable is bilateral exports at 
current prices, LYY is the product of GDPs of Germany and recipient country j, LPOP is the product of 
populations of Germany and recipient country j, LBAIDG is gross bilateral German aid to country j, and 
LEUAID is aid of EU countries (except Germany) to country j. PTA denotes countries that are part of the 
preferential trade agreements with the EU, INDEP denotes independent states and WTO denotes members of 
GATT and WTO. CAR(1) denotes a common AR(1) term, that was added to the regressions in  column (2). t-
statistics reported. (1) Bhargaba et al. (1982) Durbin-Watson indicates that first order autocorrelation is not longer 
present. 
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Table 2. Dynamic gravity model estimation results for sub-groups of countries  
(Dynamic 2SFGLS with FE, Equation in levels, yearly data) 
Variables BMZ Non_BMZ LDC ACP 
LX(-1) 0.768 0.414 0.563 0.447 
 23.176 3.648 7.2 4.173 
LYY 0.218 0.449 0.257 0.295 
 5.291 4.833 3.353 4.023 
LPOP 
-0.295 0.001 0.113 -0.083 
 
-2.516 0.003 0.4 -0.503 
LEXRN 0.008 -0.001 -0.022 -0.018 
 1.373 -0.039 -1.396 -1.232 
LBAIDG 0.047 0.028 0.056 0.042 
 4.099 1.146 2.618 2.101 
LEUAID 
-0.025 0.026 0.045 0.013 
 
-2.431 1.218 1.743 0.688 
PTA 
-0.02 -0.276 -0.167 0.041 
 
-0.567 -2.699 -1.956 0.422 
INDEP 
 2.078  1.719 
 
 4.048  3.842 
WTO 0.02 -0.091 -0.138 -0.081 
 0.851 -1.38 -2.293 -1.319 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Long-Run Aid Coeff 0.203 0.048 0.128 0.076 
Adj. R Sq. 0.862 0.549 0.563 0.551 
Nobs 1926 1337 1187 1693 
Log-Likelihood 
-167.522 -1006.945 -748.412 -1046.267 
Hansen test 3.172 1.316 1.354 4.955 
Probability 0.529 0.859 0.852 0.292 
Return on Aid 2.328 1.020 0.191 0.296 
 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices, LYY is the product of GDPs of Germany and 
recipient country j, LPOP is the product of populations of Germany and recipient country j, LEXCHRN is the 
bilateral exchange rate at current prices, LBAIDG is gross bilateral German aid to country j, and LEUAID is 
European Union aid to country j.  PTA denotes countries that are part of the preferential trade agreements with 
the EU, INDEP denotes independent states and WTO denotes members of GATT and WTO. All the equations 
were estimated in levels. BMZ denotes Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. t-statistics 
reported.  
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Figure 1. Estimates of time-varying coefficients for bilateral aid in the 2SFGLS fixed-
effects model  
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Appendix. Country Classifications  
 
BMZ LDC ACP 
Afghanistan  Mongolia  Afghanistan  Angola  Rwanda  
Albania  Morocco  Angola  Antigua and Barbuda  Samoa  
Algeria  Mozambique  Bangladesh  Barbados  Sao Tome and Principe  
Armenia  Myanmar  Benin  Belize  Senegal  
Azerbaijan  Namibia  Bhutan  Benin  Seychelles  
Bangladesh  Nepal  Burkina Faso  Botswana  Sierra Leone  
Belarus  Nicaragua  Burundi  Burkina Faso  Solomon Islands  
Benin  Niger  Cambodia  Cape Verde  Somalia  
Bolivia  Nigeria  Cape Verde  Central African Republic  South Africa  
Bosnia-Herzegovina Pakistan  Central African Republic  Chad  St. Kitts and Nevis  
Brazil  Paraguay  Chad  Comoros  St. Lucia  
Burkina Faso  Peru  Comoros  Congo, Dem. Rep. St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
Burundi  Philippines  Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Sudan  
Cambodia  Rwanda  Djibouti  Cote d'Ivoire  Suriname  
Cameroon  Senegal  Equatorial Guinea  Cuba  Swaziland  
Chad  Serbia and Montenegro Eritrea  Djibouti  Tanzania  
Chile  South Africa  Ethiopia  Dominica  Timor-Leste 
China  Sri Lanka  Gambia  Dominican Republic  Togo  
Colombia  Sudan  Guinea  Equatorial Guinea  Tonga  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Syria  Guinea-Bissau  Eritrea  Trinidad and Tobago  
Costa Rica  Tajikistan  Haiti  Ethiopia  Uganda  
Croatia  Tanzania  Kiribati  Fiji  Vanuatu  
Dominican Republic  Thailand  Laos  Gabon  Zambia  
Ecuador  Tunisia  Lesotho  Gambia  Zimbabwe  
Egypt  Turkey  Liberia  Ghana  
 
El Salvador  Uganda  Madagascar  Grenada  
 
Eritrea  Ukraine  Malawi  Guinea  
 
Ethiopia  Vietnam  Maldives  Guinea-Bissau  
 
Georgia  Zambia  Mali  Guyana  
 
Ghana   Mauritania  Haiti  
 
Guatemala   Mozambique  Jamaica  
 
Honduras   Myanmar  Kenya  
 
India   Nepal  Kiribati  
 
Indonesia   Niger  Lesotho  
 
Iran   Rwanda  Liberia  
 
Jordan   Samoa  Madagascar  
 
Kazakhstan   Sao Tome and Principe  Malawi  
 
Kenya   Senegal  Mali  
 
Kyrgyz Republic   Sierra Leone  Marshall Islands  
 
Laos   Solomon Islands  Mauritania  
 
Lebanon   Somalia  Mauritius  
 
Lesotho   Tanzania  Micronesia  
 
Madagascar   Timor-Leste Mozambique  
 
Malawi   Togo  Namibia  
 
Mali   Uganda  Niger  
 
Mauritania   Vanuatu  Nigeria  
 
Mexico   Yemen  Palau  
 
Moldova   Zambia  Papua New Guinea  
 
